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Abstract
Non-Consequentialist moral theories posit the existence of moral con-
straints: prohibitions on performing particular kinds of wrongful acts,
regardless of the good those acts could produce. Many have argued that
such theories cannot give satisfactory verdicts about what we morally
ought to do when there is some probability that we will violate a moral
constraint. In this article, I defend Non-Consequentialist theories from
this critique. Using a general choice-theoretic framework, I identify var-
ious types of Non-Consequentialism that have otherwise been conflated
in the debate. I then prove a number of formal possibility and impos-
sibility results establishing which types of Non-Consequentialism can –
and which cannot – give us adequate guidance through through a risky
world.
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I INTRODUCTION
Morally speaking, the world is a risky place. Everyday acts like driving, mak-
ing a promise, or purchasing a product can – for all we know – cause harm,
be insincere, or sustain others’ wrongful practices. In light of this fact, it is
surprising that few moral theories provide us any systematic guidance about
which of our risky acts are permissible and which are not. Indeed, they fail
to do so even if we idealise our everyday epistemic situation to grant us clear
knowledge of what acts we can perform in any given choice context, what their
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outcomes are likely to be, and precisely how to morally evaluate those out-
comes. For those who hope that our theories might help navigate us through
this risky world, it seems that our theories only provide us a map of a world
far more certain than our own.
In recent years, many have attempted to extend our existing moral the-
ories to cases involving uncertainty. However, they have found that Non-
Consequentialist moral theories – those which hold that what is morally right
is in some sense prior what is good – give unacceptable guidance in such cases.1
In particular, it seems that one of the hallmarks of Non-Consequentialism,
moral constraints – prohibitions on particular types of acts, regardless of the
good it might produce – systematically lead us to make unacceptable ver-
dicts about the permissibility of acts that have some probability of violating
a constraint.
Let Moral Absolutism be the class of theories that posit moral constraints.
This article investigates whether the following proposition is true:
The Problem of Risk: No Moral Absolutist theory can give adequate ver-
dicts about the permissibility of risky acts.
Despite the vigorous, decades-long debate between Moral Absolutists and their
critics, it still appears to be an open question whether the Problem of Risk is
true. To answer it, I reformulate the debate using a formal choice-theoretic
framework.2 First, I distinguish types of Moral Absolutism that have been
conflated by critics and defenders alike. Second, I clarify the terms of the
debate by precisely defining the adequacy conditions against which Moral Ab-
solutism is being judged. I then prove that while it is true that some types
of Moral Absolutism cannot jointly satisfy these adequacy conditions, it is
also true that others can do so by adopting unorthodox formal approaches to
decision-making under risk. The challenge then becomes to explain why these
successful approaches are not ‘gimmicky’ (or ad hoc) formal solutions, but
rather are firmly grounded in independently plausible substantive moral the-
ory.3 I identify substantive Non-Consequentialist moral theory that justifies
these unorthodox decision-theoretic approaches and moral constraints, more
generally. On this basis, I conclude that the Problem of Risk is false.
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Part II gives an overview of the existing debate. Part III formalises the
debate, showing that while some versions of Moral Absolutism cannot give
adequate verdicts in risky situations, others can do so. Part IV presents
an overlooked substantive justification for those versions of Moral Absolutism
that avoid the Problem of Risk. Part V concludes that, contrary to what
critics allege, Moral Absolutism can make both a formal and substantive case
for providing adequate moral guidance through a risky world.
II THE PROBLEM OF RISK
The world is also, of course, a complex place. To provide adequate ‘guidance’,
a theory would have to not only determine what is right, but also provide
a user-friendly set of instructions that would allow us to reliably determine
what the theory considers right. The former task requires that a theory have
a moral decision rule. The latter task requires a decision procedure, which
is designed to track – and, therefore, assumes the existence of – a decision
rule.4 As it stands, moral philosophers are still trying to ascertain what these
moral decision rules could be and whether they are acceptable. That is the
task of this article. It will be a further project to provide a workable decision
procedure that not only gives us guidance in principle, but also in practice.5
To make the complex tractable, and the debate more concrete, we will
consider the following simplified case:
Sacrifice: To best ensure society’s future happiness, we can bring about the
ongoing torture of an innocent child living in isolation and squalor.
Should we do so?
Some will respond that to answer this question, they need more information.
How much torture, exactly? How many people will benefit? How happy
will they be? Others will feel that these questions are repugnant, the cal-
culus irrelevant. This type of reaction captures the idea that particular acts
– like torturing a child for the happiness of others – are always impermissi-
ble, regardless of how many would benefit. However, even if this reaction is
understandable, it is unclear how it extends to cases like the following:
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Risk of Sacrifice: To best ensure society’s future happiness, we can run a
risk of our causing an innocent child to live in torture. Should we do so?
Suppose that you subscribe to the Moral Absolutist’s position in Sacrifice.
What do you say about Risk of Sacrifice? Strictly speaking, your position
towards acts taken under conditions of certainty entails nothing about those
taken under conditions of uncertainty. As such, we need to extend Moral Ab-
solutism to cover cases involving risks of violating a moral constraint. To this
end, it will be helpful to generalise from particular permissibility verdicts for
a particular set of morally-relevant features (number of people, degree of risk,
and so on) to what I shall call a moral decision rule, which determines what
we are morally permitted to do, given our options and our best understanding
of our situation. So, what moral decision rule should Moral Absolutists adopt?
Just as it was tempting to eschew calculations of others’ benefits in Sac-
rifice, it might be tempting to ignore the probabilities in Risk of Sacrifice.
This could be done in two ways. According to a moral decision rule I shall
call Positive Probability, any risk of violating a moral constraint is itself im-
permissible. However, this leads to what is known as the Paralysis Problem:
given that all of our acts have some positive probability of violating a moral
constraint.6 Ignoring the probabilities in the other direction leads to the op-
posite problem. Accepting a moral decision rule that prohibits only certainties
of violating a constraint (call this rule: Certainty) leads Moral Absolutists to
be self-effacing in real-world cases, since we can never be truly certain whether
any act will violate a constraint.
Noting that these extremes are unacceptable for Moral Absolutism, its
critics have suggested an intermediate approach, called Moral Certainty, which
holds that acts are impermissible if they are sufficiently certain to violate a
moral constraint, where this can be specified as a fixed probability threshold,
t. However, they then point out that Moral Certainty is also problematic,
since it seems to generate inconsistent verdicts in cases like the following:
Multiple Risks of Sacrifice: To best ensure society’s future happiness, ev-
ery week we can run a permissible risk of a child living in torture. For
each week, the probability is below the threshold t. However, over time,
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the cumulative probability will become greater than t. What should we
do?
So long as a permissible degree of risk exists, whatever that threshold happens
to be, a theory that accepts Moral Certainty may nevertheless permit each
individual risk while at the same time prohibiting all of the risks being run.
To critics, this advice seems inconsistent, if not outright paradoxical: how
could it be that we do something impermissible via a series of acts that are
permissible? Another way to put the problem is that, implausibly, Moral
Certainty seems to change its verdicts depending on whether we describe the
very same risky acts individually or collectively.7
Thus, having considered these moral decision rules and found each to be
wanting, critics make the following claim:
The Problem of Risk: There exists no Absolutist moral decision rule that
can give adequate verdicts about the permissibility of risky acts.
III MODELLING THE PROBLEM OF RISK
As it stands, the Problem of Risk is simply a conjecture. Critics of Moral
Absolutism have considered only a few moral decision rules, which for all we
know are not exhaustive. Defenders of Moral Absolutism have offered other
moral decision rules, including more sophisticated versions of Moral Certainty.8
Unfortunately for Moral Absolutists, these new rules encounter difficulties of
their own.9 Thus, the state of the debate is that some theorists conjecture
that the Problem of Risk is true, whereas others argue that it is false. Who is
correct?
III.A A CHOICE-THEORETIC APPROACH
To make progress on this question, I will now recast the debate over the Prob-
lem of Risk using a highly general choice-theoretic framework defined by Di-
etrich and List (2017).10
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This choice-theoretic framework is distinctive in that it encodes what a
moral theory says about the permissibility of a particular act in a given choice
context, based on the moral properties of that act in that context. Differ-
ent moral theories will give different lists of what moral properties exist and
which ones are relevant to a given choice context. They will also rank moral
properties differently, holding that some moral properties outweigh or defeat
other moral properties. Given a set of available acts to choose from, and a
ranking of the moral properties possessed by those acts, a moral decision rule
will determine which (if any) of your available acts are permissible.
Some aspects of this framework can be immediately applied to the Problem
of Risk to sharpen the existing debate. For example, consider the following
distinction the framework makes about different types of moral properties:
• An option property is possessed by an act itself, irrespective of its con-
text.
• A context property is possessed by an act solely on the basis of its context.
• A relational property is possessed by an act because of both the act itself
and the context.
As we will see in the following section, these property types allow us to dis-
tinguish otherwise conflated types of Moral Absolutism.
Other aspects of the framework must be elaborated slightly to best shed
light on the Problem of Risk. For example, to accommodate our target cases
involving risk, we will take the relevant moral properties of acts to be epistemic
modal properties, based on your best understanding of the possible outcomes
an act, and how probable those outcomes are to occur, given that you perform
the act. That is, the moral properties will relate to an act’s prospect. The ques-
tion for Moral Absolutists will be whether they can give acceptable verdicts
about the permissibility of various prospects of violating a moral constraint.
A further helpful elaboration will be to introduce the following two notions
of moral equivalence:
• Morally equivalent acts are equally permissible across contexts.
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• Morally equivalent contexts agree on the permissibility of acts.
These notions of moral equivalence will help us track whether permissibility
verdicts are consistent by allowing us to substitute equivalent acts between
equivalent contexts.11
I will also introduce a substantive distinction between two classes of moral
properties: those pertaining to what is right, and those pertaining to what is
good. As a first approximation, rightness properties denote whether an act
expresses respect for others as persons. An act is wrongful to the extent that
it expresses disrespect. Let a goodness property be associated with the states
of affairs those acts produce, typically defined in terms of aggregate wellbeing.
Understood in this extended framework, Substantive Consequentialism
holds that the set of good-making properties is identical to the set of right-
making properties. For instance, one might hold that respecting others as
persons simply is acting in a way that maximises aggregate wellbeing. By
contrast, Substantive Non-Consequentialism will hold that these sets of prop-
erties are distinct, arguing that it is possible to wrongfully maximise aggregate
wellbeing or rightfully fail to do so. Moreover, they hold that right-making
properties have some degree of priority over good-making properties. Moral
Absolutist theories are Non-Consequentialist theories that posit a particularly
strong priority of the right over the good: in Sacrifice, the rightness of not
torturing a child defeats the goodness of any amount of happiness for others.
With this extended framework in hand, we will now revisit the debate over
the Problem of Risk.
III.B TYPES OF MORAL ABSOLUTISM
Understood in this framework, Moral Absolutism holds that there are some
properties that always render an act morally impermissible. More precisely:
Moral Absolutism: Some kinds of acts have a particular wrong-making prop-
erty P¯ , such that they are always impermissible.
Although this definition helps to clarify the structure of Moral Absolutism,
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it needs to be further refined. This is because, as Jackson and Smith (2006)
note, there is a trivial sense in which almost all moral theories are absolutist:
Here we need to understand P¯ as a property of an action as opposed to
a relation between an action and available alternatives to that action.
Classical utilitarianism absolutely prohibits doing actions that fail to
maximize utility. But an action’s failing to maximize utility is a relation
the action has to available alternatives. The distinctive feature of the
kind of absolutism that we find, for example, in Kant and the Catholic
tradition is that the absolutely prohibited kind is independent of the
nature of any available alternatives.12
Following the earlier distinction between types of properties, we can capture
the distinction between these kinds of Moral Absolutism within the choice-
theoretic framework as follows:
Option Absolutism: Whether an act possesses the absolutely prohibited
property P¯ depends only on the act, not on the context.
Recall that in contexts of uncertainty, acts are evaluated in terms of their
prospect (that is, the possible outcomes of the act, coupled with their prob-
ability). This means that if there is any act that is absolutely prohibited in
such contexts, then it is prohibited by virtue of its prospect, irrespective of
how that prospect compares to those of other available acts. Contrast Option
Absolutism with:
Relational Absolutism: Whether an act possesses the absolutely prohibited
property P¯ depends on both the act and the other available acts in the
choice context.
Relational Absolutism can include comparative considerations in the definition
of P¯ . For instance, whether or not an act possesses P¯ may depend on it having,
say, maximal rightness. As we shall see, however, Relational Absolutism does
not precisely capture the moral commitments of those typically targeted by
this critique, such as views that prioritise an individual’s right to life over any
amount of trivial pleasure for others. These views are better understood as
being committed to the following version of Absolutism:
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Property Absolutism: Whether an act possesses the absolutely prohibited
property P¯ depends whether that act possesses a particular privileged
set of properties, regardless of what other morally relevant properties it
possesses.
Property Absolutism is very plausibly the true dialectical target of the critique
of Absolutism. To see this, consider Sacrifice, whereby the privileged proper-
ties are those rightness properties concerning the importance of respecting the
child’s life, which are undefeated by any number of goodness properties that
pertain to the population’s contentment. This suggests that moral constraints
can be understood as a type of Property Absolutist theory:
Moral Constraint: Whether an act possesses the absolutely prohibited prop-
erty P¯ depends solely on its rightness properties, irrespective of its good-
ness properties.
More generally, Property Absolutism aims to capture any moral theory that
prohibits trade-offs between particular kinds of moral considerations.13
It is important to note that Property Absolutism, as defined, is compatible
with Relational Absolutism. It can hold that the absolutely prohibited acts
are those that, for example, fail to minimise a privileged set of wrongfulness
properties. This point will be important later when we discuss the limits of
the Problem of Risk. For now, we will apply this extended choice-theoretic
framework beyond definitions of Moral Absolutism to a precise specification
of what it means for a moral decision rule to be ‘adequate’.
III.C ADEQUACY CONDITIONS
Using the extended choice-theoretic framework sketched above, I present for-
malisations of the adequacy conditions commonly accepted in the debate. To
begin, it is generally assumed that Moral Absolutism cannot avoid the Prob-
lem of Risk by simply remaining silent about the permissibility of risky acts.
This suggests the following condition:
Action Guidance: For all choice contexts and all acts, if an act has a moral
property, then it is either permissible or impermissible.
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Clearly, a moral theory must do more than just satisfy Action Guidance. After
all, moral decision rules like Certainty and Positive Probability satisfy it: the
former consistently regards almost all acts to be permissible, while the latter
is consistent in prohibiting practically everything. These decision rules are
inadequate because they conflict with other conditions:
Impermissible Risk: There exist acts that are absolutely impermissible even
if they are not certain to violate a moral constraint.
Permissible Risk: There exist acts that are permissible even if they have
some positive probability of violating a moral constraint.
These conditions ensure that Moral Absolutism is neither self-effacing (by
violating Impermissible Risk) nor unduly prohibitive (by violating Permissible
Risk). The following further adequacy condition is also implicitly at play in
the debate over Moral Absolutism:
Moral Equivalence: Morally equivalent acts in morally equivalent choice
contexts are equally permissible.
This condition articulates why Moral Certainty is an inadequate decision rule:
it seems to evaluate morally equivalent risky acts differently. For example, in
Multiple Risks of Sacrifice, it appears that you are permitted to run each
risk when described individually but not as a sequence, even though they have
morally equivalent sets of properties.
A final adequacy condition is:
Moral Dominance: All else equal, if one act is less wrongful but otherwise
equally as good as another, then in a forced choice between the two acts,
it alone is permissible.
Moral Dominance is akin to a necessity constraint for risky situations. It
exhorts us to avoid choosing an act that is unnecessarily wrongful.
As mentioned, these adequacy conditions seem to be at least implicitly
accepted in the existing debate over the Problem of Risk. Moreover, they
appear to be highly plausible in their own right. In the next section, we
will determine which types of Moral Absolutism are compatible with a moral
decision rule that satisfies these conditions.
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III.D OPTION ABSOLUTISM
Recall that Option Absolutism determines the permissibility of an act solely on
the basis of the properties of the act itself, irrespective of how it compares to
available acts. In the case of risky acts, these properties are found in the act’s
prospect: that is, its possible outcomes and their probabilities of obtaining.
Thus, whether or not an act is morally prohibited is solely a function of the
features of its prospect. I will call this a:
Prohibited Prospect: A prospect whose riskiness (measured in terms of ex-
pectation value or some higher-order statistical moment) exceeds some
fixed threshold value that renders it always impermissible
This can be understood as a generalisation of the fixed probability threshold
that is standardly assumed in discussions of Moral Certainty. This lemma
helps us establish the following:
Lemma 1. Any Option Absolutist moral decision rule that satisfies Action
Guidance, Permissible Risk, and Impermissible Risk must posit the existence
of Prohibited Prospects.
This result confirms that the critics of Moral Absolutism were correct with
respect to Option Absolutism: such theories must posit some threshold-based
rule like Moral Certainty. However, the class of possible thresholds is wider
than previously noted. It may be based on the probability, expectation, vari-
ance, skew, or other statistical moments of the act. Importantly, in general,
statistical moments are multiply realisable: within a sufficiently rich domain
of choice contexts (that is, in a sufficiently risky and varied world), a single
act or a sequence of acts can have a prospect that is equivalent to a prohib-
ited prospect. These observations help reveal the first problematic result for
Option Absolutism:
Proposition 1. No Option Absolutist theory satisfies Action Guidance, Im-
permissible Risk, Permissible Risk, and Moral Equivalence.14
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This result arises from the fact that so long as there exist permissibly risky acts,
those acts can be accumulated to collectively possess a prohibited prospect.
Thus, described individually, the acts are permissible, but, described collec-
tively, they are impermissible. This result clarifies why the cases raised against
Moral Certainty are so problematic: regardless of their level of description,
morally equivalent sets of acts should be equally permissible.
Option Absolutists must therefore either deny one of the above adequacy
conditions or, since the result does not prove the existence of such cases, they
may seek to deny that they are possible. One approach would be to posit
a privileged level of act-description, precluding the possibility of intelligible
comparisons between higher- and lower-level descriptions of acts. Another
approach might hold that moving between levels of description always involves
changing the moral properties at play, such that there is a morally relevant
difference between considering acts individually and considering them as a
sequence. In this way, no sequence would ever be morally equivalent to a single
act, since there are non-equivalent, sui generis moral properties that apply to
each. Finally, Option Absolutists may hold that the set of impermissible risks
is context-variant in a way that carefully avoids equivalencies between any
permissible risks one might perform and any prohibited prospect they might,
together, become equivalent to. The challenge for these approaches is to avoid
inconsistent verdicts without invoking relational properties and, also, without
being objectionably ad hoc in how they determine the privileged level of act-
description, the existence of emergent moral properties, or the context-variant
threshold.
Whatever the outcome of these theoretical manoeuvres, Option Absolutism
faces another challenge: it violates Moral Dominance.
Proposition 2. No Option Absolutist theory satisfies Action Guidance, Per-
missible Risk, Impermissible Risk, and Moral Dominance.
This simple result exploits the fact that Option Absolutism, by definition,
excludes comparative information about acts. Thus, it is apt to treat dom-
inating acts and dominated acts alike once both pass the threshold of being
a prohibited prospect. This is problematic because there is something to be
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said in favour of dominating acts (namely, they are less wrongful), but nothing
to be said in favour of dominated acts. Thus, if we are faced with a forced
choice situation, Option Absolutism treats more and less wrongful acts alike,
insisting that we face a moral dilemma.
Again, Option Absolutists may instead seek to deny the possibility of such
cases. One example would be to adopt a context-variant threshold for what
counts as a prohibited prospect, whereby the relevant threshold is set to avoid
violating Moral Dominance.15 However, this amounts to treating Option Ab-
solutism as a covert form of Relational Absolutism, whereby the absolutely
prohibited property is determined by reference to the prospects of the other
available acts.
Overall, in the face of these incompatibilities, it is difficult to see a plausible
path forward for Option Absolutism. As we shall see, however, there are other
avenues by which moral constraints can avoid the Problem of Risk.
III.E RELATIONAL ABSOLUTISM
Given the above results, it is tempting for Moral Absolutists to adopt Re-
lational Absolutism, allowing for comparative considerations among acts. In
particular, the following moral decision rule would seem appropriate:
Expected Moral Value: An act is permissible if and only if it maximises
expected (‘probability-weighted’) moral value.
As we shall see, however, without further constraints on the moral theory, this
way of avoiding the Problem of Risk amounts to a Faustian Gamble for Moral
Absolutists: they give adequate verdicts about risky acts, but at the cost of
surrendering their commitment to moral constraints.
To illustrate, suppose that Moral Absolutists follow the suggestion of hold-
ing that the moral value of not violating a constraint is much greater than the
value of violating a constraint for the sake of some good.16 Suppose also that
they accept the following background assumption:
Moral Separability: The contribution of a moral property to the moral
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value of an act is always unaffected by whether that act possesses or
lacks other moral properties.
This simply holds that the moral value of any moral property – say, that
of giving some amount of happiness to some individual – is unaffected by
what other properties are relevant to the act or its context. With this often
overlooked background assumption now made salient, we can now observe the
following result:
Proposition 3. No Relational Absolutist theory satisfies Moral Separability,
Expected Moral Value, and Moral Constraint.17
This result arises from the fact that Moral Separability will allow for the
aggregation of moral value of doing good to such a point that it will equal or
outweigh the value of doing what is right. This shows that Moral Absolutists
cannot avoid the Problem of Risk by simply adopting expected value theory.
Rather, as we shall see, to make use of these decision-theoretic resources, Moral
Absolutists must further clarify what it means for the right to be prior to the
good.
III.F PROPERTY ABSOLUTISM
Having found both Option Absolutism and an unrestricted version of Rela-
tional Absolutism to be unsatisfactory solutions to the Problem of Risk, we
will now see that Property Absolutism has a promising path forward. Indeed:
Proposition 4. There exist Property Absolutist moral decision rules that sat-
isfy Moral Constraint, Action Guidance, Permissible Risk, Impermissible Risk,
Moral Dominance, and Moral Equivalence.18
The first moral decision rule we will consider is compatible with Moral Separa-
bility, but it drops Expected Moral Value in favour of a set of value functions
representing multiple dimensions of value and a strict hierarchy between them.
This is known as a lexicographic value function.19 This function allows us to
define the following moral decision rule:
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Lexicographic Moral Value: Given a ranked set of moral value functions,
an act is permissible if it uniquely maximises expected value with respect
to the highest-ranked value function; or, if there is a tie, then it is the
tied act that uniquely maximises the next-highest-ranked value function;
and so on. If there is no further value function, then all remaining tied
acts are permissible.
If we understand moral value as consisting of two dimensions – the right and
the good – then this moral decision rule can straightforwardly uphold Moral
Constraint. It exhorts us to maximise with respect to rightness, and to resort
to maximising goodness only if our acts are equally right.20 Crucially, it also
satisfies the adequacy conditions of the debate.21 Thus, it shows that the
Problem of Risk is false with respect to Property Absolutism.
Of course, this moral decision rule raises a number of questions of its own.
In particular, within a general expected value framework, it implies that any
prospect of doing what is right, no matter how slight, defeats any prospect of
doing good, no matter how certain. What could justify this extremely strict
hierarchy between the right and the good? We will revisit this question in the
following section.
An alternative approach to the lexicographic model is based on a denial of
Moral Separability. A Property Absolutist theory that does so can adopt:
Bounded Moral Value: The moral value of particular goodness properties,
when they compete with rightness properties, diminishes such that their
cumulative value asymptotically converges to a limit below the value of
the rightness properties.
This approach allows for less strict hierarchies between competing prospects
concerning the right and the good, while nevertheless preserving Moral Con-
straint in cases of certainty. By positing Bounded Moral Value, Property
Absolutists can adopt Expected Moral Value and avoid the Problem of Risk.22
Like the lexicographic approach, this model raises questions. In this case,
the challenge is not so much justifying a maximally strict priority of the right
over the good; the challenge is in justifying the bounded moral value of non-
privileged moral properties. After all, why should the moral value of someone’s
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benefit be diminished by the fact that others also benefit, or by the fact that
it came at the cost of someone else?23
Without a satisfactory answer to these questions, the above solutions to
the Problem of Risk appear unprincipled. However, I shall argue that these
solutions are underwritten a well-developed but overlooked body of substantive
Non-Consequentialist theorising. Not only does this theorising make sense of
these formal possibility results, it also reveals an important but under-explored
difference between how Moral Absolutists and their critics understand the
structure and substance of morality.
IV JUSTIFYING MORAL ABSOLUTISM
We have arrived via various formal results to the conclusion that Moral Ab-
solutism must make unorthodox structural commitments in order to give ad-
equate verdicts about the permissibility of risky acts. I shall argue that these
commitments are best understood as being entailed by Non-Consequentialist
moral theorising that accepts the following:
Moral Inseparability: The contribution of a moral property to the moral
value of an act is sometimes affected by whether that act possesses or
lacks other moral properties.
Recall that, in the framework we are using, a moral theory determines the
permissibility of acts according to its moral properties. Moral Separability
obtains when a moral theory treats each property’s moral value as being inde-
pendent, unaffected by the other properties it is bundled with. By contrast,
Moral Inseparability obtains when a moral theory treats at least some moral
properties as being inseparable from the presence or absence of others, leading
to evaluations of acts that cannot always be expressed as the linear sum of the
individual value of its properties. Simply put, on this view, the moral value
of acts depends on the combinations and interactions of the moral properties
they possess.
With the idea of Moral Inseparability now clearly in view, we can now more
easily see a justification of moral constraints that has so far been overlooked
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in the debate over the Problem of Risk. In Sacrifice, why should it be that
there is not some number of people we could benefit to justify the torture of
another?
Assuming Moral Separability has led critics and proponents alike to posit
infinite moral value to upholding constraints, which has led to the problematic
assertion that life is of infinite value.24 Assuming Moral Inseparability makes
possible the following, far more plausible, assertion: the moral value of your
doing good fundamentally depends on your not performing particular kinds of
wrongs. So, in cases like Sacrifice, there is limited to no moral value to your
social beneficence, given that you tortured a child to do so.
Moral Inseparability thus gives a distinctive understanding of the nature
of the priority of the right over the good: it is priority in the sense of pre-
conditionality : the moral worth of our acts depends on particular requirements
being met. Without meeting these preconditions, you cannot justify doing
wrong by finding a suitable amount of good that could flow from it. This
rationale represents a deep point of difference between how Consequentialists
and Non-Consequentialists understand morality.
Indeed, although we reached the idea of Moral Inseparability by a formal
route, Non-Consequentialists long-identified this point of difference by way of
more substantive argumentation. For example, Immanuel Kant – Moral Ab-
solutist par excellence – argues that the moral worth of acts is conditional
on a ‘good will’, which has unconditional value. Kant holds that “it need
not ... be the sole and complete good, but it must be the highest good and
the condition of every other, even of all demands for happiness.”25 Indeed,
it is very plausible that Moral Inseparability allows us to best make sense of
Non-Consequentialist moral concepts like ‘right reason’ accounts of practical
reasoning, the doing/allowing distinction.26 Furthermore, the idea is invoked
in discussions of distributive justice, such as by Larry Temkin (1993; 2012),
who appeals to Moral Inseparability in his explorations of the measures and
moral value of distributive equality.27 And perhaps the most extensive ex-
ploration and defence of Moral Inseparability is found in the work of Frances
Kamm (1993; 1996; 2007) whose casuistic arguments give rise to a variety of
‘contextual interaction’ principles explaining how the moral contribution of
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some moral properties of our acts may depend on the presence or absence of
others.28 Critics of Moral Absolutism have ignored this rich vein of moral
theorising. In doing so, they have overlooked a promising rationale for moral
constraints, as well as the moral decision rules that allow Moral Absolutists
to solve the Problem of Risk.
To see this, we need to make precise what these theorists mean when they
say that morality is “complex” or “intricate”. As a first approximation, let
us hold that the moral value of at least some goodness properties to some
degree depends on an act having some rightness properties. These goodness
properties are conditionally valuable. A plausible reading of these theorists
is that this conditionality is generally one-directional: for example, the value
of doing right is not affected by whether or not good is done. Thus, some
properties (such as goodness) are conditionally valuable, whereas others (such
as rightness) are unconditionally valuable. Evaluating an act will be complex
because it may possess a combination of conditionally and unconditionally
valuable properties. This means that evaluating an action requires more than
merely listing its properties; we need to also acknowledge the structure (or
“intricacy”) of the particular combination of properties at hand.29
Both of the solutions to the Problem of Risk can be explained by combin-
ing Moral Inseparability with an agent-focused understanding of morality.30
With respect to Lexicographic Moral Value, the claim the Moral Absolutist is
making is that the value of your beneficence is entirely conditional on you re-
specting others (in particular, by not torturing them). At best, these goodness
considerations are relevant only for breaking ties between otherwise equally
rightful acts. Similarly, when Moral Absolutists invoke Moral Inseparability, a
commitment to Bounded Moral Value amounts to the claim that the value of
your doing good is only partially cancelled when it runs counter to doing what
is right. Both solutions are therefore entailed by more or less strict stances
about how doing what is right constrains the moral value of doing good. Thus,
by recalling their commitment to the priority of the right over the good, Moral
Absolutism can refute the Problem of Risk.
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V CONCLUSION
Many believe that accepting moral constraints would lead us to make mistaken
verdicts about the permissibility of risky actions. This article has shown that
this belief is mistaken: using a general choice-theoretic model of Moral Abso-
lutist theories, we have seen that there do exist moral decision rules that uphold
moral constraints while offering adequate verdicts about the permissibility of
risky acts. Justifying these decision rules, however, required re-examining the
substantive underpinnings of moral constraints. I have proposed that moral
constraints are most plausible when they are grounded in the idea that the
moral properties of our acts are not always separable from one other. In par-
ticular, the moral value of doing good at least sometimes depends on whether
that act is wrongful. Viewed in this lens, the fanaticism commonly attributed
to Moral Absolutism fades; we are Absolutists only so long as we hold that the
moral value of our acts crucially depends on our respecting that which matters
most.31
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VI APPENDIX
VI.A THE CHOICE-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
Acts: Let an act x be something that you are certain you would perform, if
you were to intend to perform it. The set of all possible acts is denoted
X . Acts are mutually exclusive relative to a choice context, such that
when you choose to perform one act, you are thereby choosing not to
perform any other act in that particular choice context.
Choice Contexts: A choice context k minimally consists of a set of acts,
denoted [k]. It can be enriched to include information about, among
other things, the identity of the actor, time, and other features relevant
to the choice situation. The set of all possible contexts is K.
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Properties: A property P is a primitive that refers to a set of act-context
pairs 〈x, k〉. The extension of P is denoted [P ]. The set of all possible
properties is P .
Act-Context Property: When an act-context pair 〈x, k〉 possesses a par-
ticular property P we write: 〈x, k〉 ∈ [P ]. The set of properties of an
act-context pair is P (x, k).
Option Property: For all x ∈ X and all k1, k2 ∈ K, 〈x, k1〉 ∈ [P ] if and only
if 〈x, k2〉 ∈ [P ].
Context Property: For all k ∈ K and all x1, x2 ∈ X , 〈x1, k〉 ∈ [P ] if and
only if 〈x2, k〉 ∈ [P ].
Relational Property: The set of P /∈ POption
⋃
PContext.
Normative Relevance Function: N denotes a normative relevance func-
tion, which assigns to each context k ∈ K a set N(k) of morally relevant
properties in that context. The set of morally relevant properties of an
act in a particular context is denoted by N(x, k).32
Defeat Relation: denoted ., is a binary relation whose relata are subsets of
the universal set of properties, P . When one set of properties P1 stands
in this relation to another set P2, formally P1 . P2, then P1 defeats P2.
If neither set of properties defeats the other, then P1 ∼ P2.33
Moral Decision Rule: Where R is a function from k to R(k) and R(k) is a
subset of [k], a defeat relation is defined as: R(k) = {x ∈ [k] : it is not
the case that the morally relevant properties of any other act in context
k defeat the properties of x in k}.34
The following are structural features of the defeat relation that are normally
hidden in standard treatments of moral decision-making under risk, but which
are clearly and precisely expressible in this framework:
Moral Separability: The defeat relation is separable if and only if for any
comparable disjoint subsets P1, P2 and P3 of the universal set of proper-
ties P , P1 D P2 ⇐⇒ P1
⋃
P3 D P2
⋃
P3.
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Moral Inseparability: The ranking relation is inseparable if and only if for
some comparable disjoint subsets P1, P2 and P3 of the universal set of
properties P , P1 D P2 but P1
⋃
P3 4 P2
⋃
P3.
To recap, this choice-theoretic framework allows us to ranks acts according to
their respective bundles of moral properties. Using a ranking that is based on
a separable or inseparable defeat relation, a moral decision rule will hold that
an act is permissible if and only if its set of properties is undefeated; an act
is impermissible if and only if its set of properties is defeated by the set of
properties of some other act.
VI.B EXTENSIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK
To formalise the Problem of Risk, I will make the following elaborations and
extensions to Dietrich & List’s framework.
VI.B.1 MORAL DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK
As foregrounded by Dietrich & List (2017: Appendix D) the above framework
can be elaborated to apply to situations of moral decision-making under risk.
As a general approach, I will describe acts in situations of uncertainty in terms
of their prospects (denoted λ): that is, the set of an act’s possible outcomes,
coupled with their probability of obtaining given that the act is performed. My
use of the framework is neutral with respect to the various decision theories
one might adopt.35
VI.B.2 THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
Dietrich and List (2017: 435-436) provide structural definitions of Consequen-
tialism and Non-Consequentialism. To better track the dialectic between Ab-
solutists and their critics, I will instead define these theories as follows:
Substantive Consequentialism: The morally relevant properties are the
goodness properties, which are identical to the rightness properties, such
that ∀x ∈ X and ∀k ∈ K, N(x, k) = PGood(= PRight).
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Substantive Non-Consequentialism: The morally relevant properties are
the rightness properties as well as goodness properties, where PRight 6=
PGood.
With this distinction in hand, we can articulate how these theories rank bun-
dles of these properties. Substantive Consequentialist defeat relations will rank
singleton sets of properties. Their Non-Consequentialist counterparts will rank
non-singleton sets that include bundles of rightness and goodness properties.
Absolutist theories will have Non-Consequentialist defeat relations that have
the following constraint:
Moral Constraint: If an act x possesses a particular subset of wrong-making
properties PWrongful (a subset of the rightness properties), then it is
impermissible regardless of the good-making properties it possesses.
These definitions isolate the substance of the views that are targeted by the
Problem of Risk. As we shall see, however, the Problem of Risk targets views
by virtue of their structure. As a first approximation, this Absolutist structure
is as follows:
Moral Absolutism: If 〈x, k〉 ∈ [P¯ ], then 〈x, k〉 /∈ R(k).36
Where P¯ is an absolutely prohibited moral property. Drawing on the structural
distinctions between types of properties, we can define the following versions
of Absolutism:
Option Absolutism: The absolutely prohibited acts possess P¯ solely by
virtue of their option properties.
Relational Absolutism: The absolutely prohibited acts possess P¯ by virtue
of their relational properties.
Property Absolutism: There exist privileged properties P ∗ (for example,
PWrongful) such that if 〈x, k〉 ∈ [P ∗] then 〈x, k〉 ∈ [P¯ ], such that 〈x, k〉 /∈
R(k), regardless of what other properties 〈x, k〉 possesses.
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To underwrite the moral decision rules that let Moral Absolutism avoid the
Problem of Risk, I will briefly expand on the idea of Moral Inseparability.37
Property Possession: Recall that an act-context pair 〈x, k〉 possesses a set
of moral properties. If a property P is present in that set, it is denoted
{P}. If a property is absent, we denote it as {¬P}.
Moral Dependence: A relation between sets of properties P1, P2, whereby
(P1 | P2) means “P1 given P2”.
Conditional Value: A set of properties P1 is conditionally valuable if for
some disjoint set of properties P2, (P1 | P2)  (P1 | ¬P2).
Unconditional Value: A set of properties P1 is unconditionally valuable if
for any disjoint set of properties P2, (P1 | P2) ∼ (P1 | ¬P2).
Using this sketch of a framework, Moral Inseparability theories will evaluate
an act based on its structured set of properties, consisting of both its moral
properties and the moral dependencies (if any) that exist between them.
For example, P (x, k) ∈ {(PGood|PRight), PRight} represents that act x in con-
text k possesses both a goodness property that morally depends on a rightness
property and a rightness property that is unconditionally valuable.
VI.B.3 MORAL EQUIVALENCIES
We will next define various moral equivalence principles, formally defined as
equivalence classes on the set of possible outcomes, acts, and contexts, where
‘≡’ stands for the relation ‘is morally equivalent to’.
Morally Equivalent Acts: ∀x1, x2 ∈ X , x1 ≡ x2 ⇐⇒ ∀k ∈ K, x1 ∈
R(k)⇔ x2 ∈ R(k).
This formulation makes precise the idea of ‘equal permissibility’ by defining
morally equivalent acts as those that can be substituted between any context.
Morally Equivalent Contexts: ∀k1, k2 ∈ K, k1 ≡ k2 ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ X , x ∈
R(k1)⇔ x ∈ R(k2).
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This formulation holds that contexts are morally equivalent when they always
agree on the permissibility of acts. A corollary of Morally Equivalent Acts and
Morally Equivalent Contexts is:
Morally Equivalent Act-Context Pairs: 〈x1, k1〉 ≡ 〈x2, k2〉 ⇐⇒ x1 ≡
x2 and k1 ≡ k2.
This shows that the above notions of moral equivalence can bridge different
acts in different contexts.
However, in various discussions of Moral Absolutism, there has been signif-
icant disagreement about putative cases of moral equivalency.38 In an attempt
to avoid this, I will compare the same acts and choice contexts to themselves,
albeit under different levels of description.39 Intuitively, a higher-level descrip-
tion of an act refers to a ‘plan’, ‘policy’, or ‘course of action’, one that will often
correspond to a set or sequence of more specifically described (lower-level) acts.
Similarly, a higher-level description of a context can often be understood as a
planning context consisting of a number of discrete choices.
I will hold that higher-level descriptions of act-context pairs are not only
necessitated by lower-level descriptions but are also reducible to them in the
sense that the moral properties of higher-level acts are always instantiated
by, and explainable in terms of the moral properties of the lower-level acts
on which they are based. In this way, higher-level descriptions of act-context
pairs (denoted 〈X,K〉) are morally equivalent to their lower-level descriptions
(denoted 〈x, k〉), because they pick out the very same sets of moral properties.40
In the following section, I will present formulations of the Adequacy Condi-
tions that any moral decision rule should satisfy. These conditions are intended
to hold for all levels of act-context description.
VI.C ADEQUACY CONDITIONS
Action Guidance: For all k in K and for all x in [k], if N(x, k) 6= ∅, then
x ∈ R(k) or x /∈ R(k).
Permissible Risk: There exist k ∈ K and x in [k] such that P (x, k) : ‘prob-
ability of producing an outcome in which a moral constraint is violated
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is greater than zero’ and 〈x, k〉 /∈ [P¯ ].
Impermissible Risk: There exist k ∈ K and x ∈ [k] such that P (x, k) :
‘probability of producing an outcome in which a moral constraint is
violated is less than one’ and 〈x, k〉 ∈ [P¯ ].
Moral Equivalence: If 〈x1, k1〉 ≡ 〈x2, k2〉, then 〈x1, k1〉 ∈ R(k1) ⇐⇒ 〈x2, k2〉 ∈
R(k2).
Moral Dominance: For arbitrary subsets PR, PR+ ∈ PRight and PG ∈ PGood,
where PR+ . PR, if P (x1, k) = {PR+ , PG} and P (x2, k) = {PR, PG}, then
x1 ∈ R(k) and x2 /∈ R(k).
VI.D PROOFS
VI.D.1 OPTION ABSOLUTISM
Prohibited Prospect: a prospect (denoted λ¯) whose expectation value or
higher-order statistical moment exceeds some fixed threshold value that
renders it always impermissible.
Lemma 1. If an Option Absolutist theory satisfies Action Guidance, Permissi-
ble Risk, and Impermissible Risk, then it must posit the existence of Prohibited
Prospects.
Proof. Option Absolutism holds that within the universal set of possible acts
there exists a subset of acts that are absolutely prohibited by virtue of the
moral properties of the acts themselves. In moral decision-making under risk,
an act is represented by its prospect: its set of probability-outcome pairs.
We will assume that the set of possible, risky acts is ordered according to
some measure of risk of violating a moral constraint (e.g. expected value or
some higher-order statistical moment), such that acts that have more risk are
defeated by those that have less. By Impermissible Risk, a subset of these
risky acts are absolutely prohibited. By Permissible Risk, however, not all
risky acts are absolutely prohibited. Hence, the set of Impermissible Risks is
bounded by the set of Permissible Risks. If there is a least risky Impermissible
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Risk, then that constitutes the threshold. If there is no such act, then the
‘gap’ between the sets is the unique threshold. In either case, there is a unique
threshold value of risk delineating those acts that Option Absolutists consider
absolutely prohibited from those that may be permissible.
Lemma 2. If an Option Absolutist theory satisfies Permissible Risk, Moral
Separability, and Moral Equivalence, then it satisfies the following Agglomera-
tion Principle: for any arbitrary subset of permissible acts, {〈x1, k1〉, 〈x2, k2〉,
..., 〈 xn, kn〉}, its higher-level description, 〈X,K〉, is also permissible.
Proof. Let {〈x1, k1〉, 〈x2, k2〉, ..., 〈xn, kn〉} be a set of permissible acts that have
some non-zero probability of producing an outcome in which a moral constraint
is violated. Note that, given Moral Separability, the moral properties (and,
hence, permissibility) of the acts in each choice context are unaffected by the
presence or absence of other acts’ moral properties. Let K be a higher-level
description of the above set of contexts {k1, ..., kn}. Being a reducible, higher-
level description, K is a morally equivalent context to {k1, ..., kn}. It follows
that the set of acts {x1, ..., xn} is permissible in K. Let X be a higher-level
description of these permissible risks. Given that X is morally equivalent to
these permissible risks, X ∈ R(K).
Proposition 1. No Option Absolutist theory satisfies Action Guidance, Im-
permissible Risk, Permissible Risk, Moral Separability and Moral Equivalence.
Proof. By Permissible Risk, there exist a set of permissible acts, {〈x1, k1〉,
〈x2, k2〉, ..., 〈xn, kn〉}, that each have some positive probability of producing
an outcome in which a constraint is violated. By Lemma 2, a higher-level de-
scription of such act-context pairs is also permissible. That is, 〈X,K〉 ∈ R(K).
By Lemma 1, Option Absolutism posits the existence of Prohibited Prospects,
λ¯. For a suitably rich domain of choice contexts, there exists some number n
of permissible risks such that their higher-level description X is morally equiv-
alent to some λ¯, and therefore absolutely prohibited. Thus, 〈X,K〉 ∈ R(K)
but also 〈X,K〉 /∈ R(K), violating Action Guidance.
Proposition 2. No Option Absolutist theory satisfies Action Guidance, Per-
missible Risk, Impermissible Risk, and Moral Dominance.
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Proof. By Lemma 1, there exist prohibited prospects, λ¯. Let x1 be an act
with a prohibited prospect. Let x2 be an act with a prohibited prospect that
is more wrongful but equally as good as x1, such that x1 morally dominates
x2. By Moral Dominance, in a restricted choice context involving only these
two acts, x1 is permissible. Hence, x1 is both permissible and impermissible,
violating Action Guidance.
VI.D.2 RELATIONAL ABSOLUTISM
Proposition 3. No Relational Absolutist theory satisfies Expected Moral Value,
Moral Constraint, and Moral Separability.
Proof. Suppose that a Relational Absolutist theory admits an expected value
representation such that for any arbitrary act-context pairs 〈x1, k〉 and 〈x2, k〉,
v(x1, k) > v(x2, k) just in case P (x1, k) . P (x2, k). Given Moral Separability,
the defeat relation ranks property sets of the form PGood=n in increasing lin-
ear order with n, such that the value of acts with this property increases in
proportion with the amount of good done. By Moral Constraint, there exists
some subset of wrongful properties PWrongful, such that any act that pos-
sesses them is impermissible, regardless of its goodness properties. However,
for any real-valued expected value assignment of these wrongful properties
and some arbitrary rightness property PRight, there exists some number n
such that if P (x1, k) = {PGood=n, PWrongful} and P (x2, k) = {PRight}, then
v(x1, k) > v(x2, k). Given a choice between these two acts, x1 ∈ R(k) and
x2 /∈ R(k), violating Moral Constraint.
VI.D.3 PROPERTY ABSOLUTISM
Proposition 4. There exist Property Absolutist moral decision rules that sat-
isfy Moral Constraint, Action Guidance, Permissible Risk, Impermissible Risk,
Moral Dominance, and Moral Equivalence.
Proof. Lexicographic Moral Value: Assume a Property Absolutist theory
whose defeat relation over prospects entails the moral decision rule Lexico-
graphic Moral Value. To illustrate this rule, suppose there are two dimensions
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of moral value (e.g. one based on the rightness properties and the other based
on goodness properties), where these dimensions are ordered such that an act
is morally permissible just in case it either: it uniquely maximises moral value
with respect to the higher-ranked dimension; or, if it ties with some other act,
it maximises the next ranked dimension (e.g. goodness). This decision rule
satisfies Action Guidance, since for all acts, an act will either be permissi-
ble or impermissible depending on whether it has the same, more, or lesser
lexicographic moral value than its alternatives. This rule satisfies Moral Dom-
inance, since dominating acts will have higher lexicographic value than their
alternatives. This rule satisfies Permissible Risk because there exist contexts in
which an act that maximises lexicographic value nevertheless possesses some
risk of bringing about an outcome in which a constraint is violated. Simi-
larly for Impermissible Risk, where the impermissible act is one that has lower
expected rightness (or, where there is a tie, lower expected goodness). It sat-
isfies Moral Constraint if minimising the privileged wrongfulness properties
has lexicographic priority over the goodness properties. Lastly, Moral Equiv-
alence is satisfied because morally equivalent sets of properties have the same
lexicographic moral value, such that they are equally permissible.
Expected Moral Value: When coupled with Bounded Moral Value, this
moral decision rule satisfies Action Guidance, Permissible Risk, Impermissi-
ble Risk, and Moral Dominance in a closely similar fashion to Lexicographic
Moral Value, except it adopts a one-dimensional value function rather than
a multi-dimensional one. This approach satisfies Moral Equivalence because
if two acts’ respective structured sets of properties are equally ranked across
morally equivalent contexts, they are therefore equally permissible. It satisfies
Moral Constraint if the value of doing good, versus that of doing what is right,
is bounded such that for any arbitrary act-context pair and for some subset of
rightness properties PWrongful (i.e. the particularly wrongful ones), some ar-
bitrary rightness property PRight, and goodness property PGood=n, there exists
no amount of good n such that {PGood=n, PWrongful} D {PRight}.
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